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A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION ON 
COMBATTING 
FRAUD AND COUNTERFEITING OF 
NON-CASH MEANS OF PAYMENT Introduction 
While the potential for economic growth in the Union is unprecedented thanks to the advent of 
t~e Single  Market  and  to  the _Information  Society,  organised  crime  is  however  increasingly 
becoming a threat to society, organising itself across national borders and taking advantage of  the 
free  movement  of goods,  capital,  services  and  persons.  Technological  innovations  such  as 
Internet and electronic financial services turn out not only to facilitate legitimate business, but 
also to be convenient vehicles either for committing crimes or for transferring the resulting profits 
into seemingly licit activities.  · 
To  ensure  the  orderly  conduct of economic  and  social  activity  to  the  benefit  of users  and 
providers  of goods  and  services,  society  requires  sound,  user-friendly,  cnicient.  und  secure 
payment mechanisms. A key  to  promoting the necessary confidence is  to sec to  it  that adcquutc 
guarantees  exist  that  payment instruments  may  not  be  used  for  or  in  association  with  illicit 
activities. 
The European Council in Dublin, December 1996, underlined its absolute determination to fight 
organised crime and stressed the need for a coherent and coordinated approach by  the  Union. 
Turning  this  resolve  into  concrete  action,  the  European  Council  in  Amsterdam,  June  1997, 
endorsed an Action Plan to combat Organised Crime\ in which, among other things, it  calls on 
the Council and the Commission to examine and address, by the end of 1998, the issue of fraud 
and counterfeiting relating  to  all  non-cash payment instruments,  including electronic  payment 
instruments. 
2 This Communication focuses on non-cash payment instruments. The Commission is 
separately addressing the issue of  falsification and counterfeiting of  bank notes and coins in euro. 
Purely national frauds are becoming international frauds. Payment card crime, for instance can be 
committed anywhere cards are accepted as a means of payment or for money withdrawn I. As non-
cash means of payment can  he,  as a rule  accepted in  nqn facc-to-fucc  tnmsuctions. they  pluy  a 
significant  role  in  cross-border  transactions,  be  they  under  traditional  ti.mns  or  in  dcctronk 
commerce. Furthermore, large-scale frauds involve a multiplicity of "specialist" players and are 
mostly committed by organised groups of criminals. The sophistication and· intemationalisation 
· of  criminal behaviour demonstrate the need for a co-ordinated action at European level. 
The  need  to  address  the  problem  of criminal  activities  directed  at  or  involving  payment 
instruments is gathering further momentum in the light of current and prospective institutional. 
economic and technological changes; notably: 
Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime, adopted by the Council on 28 April1997, OJ  C 251, 97/C 251/01, 15 
August 1997. 
The Commission  is  presently preparing a Green  Paper on the fight  against counterteiting and  piracy  in  the 
Internal Market, which aims to  protect intellectual property rights whilst allowing tht.:  proper fum:tioning of 
Internal Market.  · 
.  ~  ·'  . o  the  changeover to the Single Currency which,  in particular throughout the  transitional 
period  before  introduction  of euro  bank  notes  and  coins,  will  be  facilitated  by  the 
availability of  transparent and secure electronic payment mechanisms; 
o  the advent of  the Information Society and Electronic Commerce which, as is highlighted in 
the Communication on "A European Initiative in Electronic Commerce"
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,  require efficient 
payment facilities. 
A Commission study of 1997 on the forms of  fraud occurring in the European Union, underlined 
in  particular  the  frequency  and  considerable  amounts  involved  in  payment  card  fraud.
4  In 
December 1996 a conference was funded by the Commission, dealing exclusively with Organised 
Payment Card Crime, whiCh  further underlined these tendencies as well as the gaps existing in 
national legislation. 
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I.  The  present  Communication  sets  out  the  Commission's. assessment  of the  problem,  and 
proposes  a  framework  of measures  to  promote  an  adequate  "securi~v  environment"  for 
payment instruments and the underlying systems. It consists of  two components: 
2. Firstly, the Commission presents (in Annex 1) a proposal for a draft Joint Action. The aim of 
the  Joint Action is  to ensure that fraud  and counterfeit of non-cash  means of payment  is 
recognised as a criminal offence in all Member States, punishable by effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive penalties. 
3.  Secondly, a further set of actions is presented (in Annex 2) for consideration by all interested 
parties. In order to assess clearly what additional measures might be needed in this field,  the 
Commission invites all interested parties to comment (in writing) to these actions no later than 
31  December 1998 to:  · 
The Director-General - DG XV 
European Commission 
Rue.de Ia Loi 200 
B-l  049 Brussels 
Fax: (+32 2) 295.65.00 
E-mail: JOHN.MOGG@DG 15.cEc.nE 
Communication  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the 
Committee of  the Regions, COM(97)  .. 157 of 15 April 1997. 
The  report  from  the  study  Fraud  Without  Frontiers  is  puhlishcd  at 
http://www.deloitte.ca/Whatsnew/Headlines/lntematFraud.htm 
The  Pinal  report  of the  project Co-operation  to  Combat Organised  Payment  Card  Crime,  organised  by  the 
Metropolitan Police, England, and the National Police Agency, The Netherlands, describes the research done as 
well as the results of the conference. 
2 1.  The nature and extent of the problem 
Although non-cash means of pr.yment  includes an  ever changing  set of component systems or 
instmments (see section 2.a below) the main statistical evidence about the size of the problem of · 
fraud  and  counterfeit  is  derived  from  the  more  senior systems,  such  as  cheques  and  payment 
cards.  The  global  payment cards industry. turnover is  fast  approaching  US  $  2.000 billion per 
year. out of which approximately US $ 3 billion is declared lost each year as  a result from card 
crimt!. This may represent only 0,15% of volume, but still considerable amounts are affected, and 
in light of the expected gro\\-1h in issuing of new cards by up  to  25 % annually. the amounts are 
far from  negligible. Approximately 25 % of all payment card losses are incttrred by issuers in the 
European  Union.  Although  losses  have  traditionally  for  the  most  part  occurred  domestically, 
increasingly they are incurred by card crimes originating abroad. 
tvleasures to combat fraud are mainly taken domestically. which in several cas1!S has led to at least 
temporary declines  in  the occurrences of domestic fraud,  while  crime  sho\VS  its adaptability by 
increasing  proportionally  internationally.  In  addition  to  the  problem  i..1f  fraud  and  counterfeit 
associated  with  cheques and  payment cards,  a  potential  risk  is  that  of the  systemic  fraud.  i.t!. 
attacks  ("hacking'')  against  the  underlying  computer net\\Wks  which  may  also  impact  on  the 
payment  instruments  and  systems.  Cross-border  card  crime  is  therefore  a  real  issue  for  the 
Member States 6f  the .European Union as well as for the payment system industry and for users. 
The European Parliament, consulted on a draft joint action aimed at the exchange of information 
bet\veen  the  law enforcement agencies and the  payment card  induStry.  insist~d on  th~ need  for 
consistent and comprehensive action when adopting its resolution on 15  t-.lay  1998. 
Payment  services  are  not  provided. in  a  legal  vacuun1.  The  aim  of the  existing  Community 
regulatory  framework  is  the  creation of a  common  single  area,  \vithin  which  capital.  people. 
goods and  sen·ic~s may freely circulate. A brief summary of the constituting elements ofsuch a 
framework is pro\·ided for in Annex L 
2.  The payment systems a'nd their actors 
This  section describes  non-cash  payment instruments  and  un~krlying paym~nt systems - thl.'ir 
t'  ..  :~ltur~:-:  - the  main  participants  therein  and  their  r~':if'<-'~'tin:  functillllS.  (ii\·en  th1.'  rapid 
d~\-t..'lopmcnt nt· the sector,  th1~ tabk belo\v is purdy .indic~lti\·e.- Furthcrnwrc. the  m~1st innovatiw 
payment instruments may provide holders \Vith the possibility of performing multiple functions. 
a)  Classification of payment instruments and systems according to their functions 
For ease of analysis, payment instruments, wit.h the exceptil,n of legal temkr (i.e. bank notes and. 
to a large extt:nt, coins), may include the following : ·  ·  ·  · 
•  pri!-paid paper instruments (e.g. travellers' cheques.  \·ouch~rs. bonus~s. etc.) 
'. 
.'\ o  stored-value electronic instruments (i.e. pre-paid cards and software-based electronic money). 
e  traditional paper instruments (e.g. cheques), 
13  traditional (quasi-)electronic instruments (e.g. all types of  payment cards, except for pre-paid 
cards: credit, debit, deferred debit cards, T&E cards)as well as 
o  remote electronic banking applications (i.e. home/phone/PC techniques). 
4 A I. Pre-paid 
paper 
Instruments 
i) travellers' 
cheques 
ii)vouchers 
Iii) bonuses 
PAYMENT INSTRUMENTS 
A2. Stored-
value electronic 
Instruments' 
i) pre-paid cards 
ii) software-
based electronic 
money 
(other than cash) 
81. 
Traditional 
paper . 
Instruments 
i) cheques, bills 
of  exchange 
ii) paper and 
electronic 
credit/debit 
transfer Orders 
82. (quasi-)  83. Remote 
Electronic  electronic 
Instruments  bank  in~ 
i) all types of  i) home/phone/ 
payment cards  PC techniques 
(except pre-
paid cards) 
ii) paper and  ii) paper and 
. e \ectron ic  electronic 
credit/debit  credit/debit 
transfer orders  transfer orders 
b)  Definition of  the actors in apaymenfsystem 
Presently,  under  a  payment scheme,  the  following  recurrent  participants  (and  functions)  may 
almost invariably be identified: 
•  "the  issuer":  this is typically the (financial) institution which, in the course of its business 
(pursuant to a contract concluded With the user) makes available to a user an instrument that 
.~  may ~e used for making payments
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;  ·  ·  · 
.  . 
•  "the  u~er  ":  this ·is  typically  a  person  (natural  and/or  legal)  who ·(pursuant  to  a  contract 
concluded with an issuer) holds a paymentinstrument that may be used for payment. 
• ·  "the  acceptor":  this  is  typically the tt:ading  ~or service  establishment that accepts,  on its 
behalf or on behalf of its network, payment of goods and services· by holders making use of a 
payment instrument; 
•  "the  acquirer":  ·this  is  typically  the  (financial)  institution  that  collects  transaction 
information from the acceptor and is  responsible for the settlement with the latter  .. 
Given that all  schemes rest on a multiplicity of issuers, users,. acceptors and  acquircrs,  it  is  not 
uncommon  tor  the  scheme  to  rely  on  mutually  agreed  procedures . tor  the  clearing  (i .c.  the 
..  In  the case of electronic money, the  issuer of the electronic money, the issuer of the  card, and the. institution 
which makes the card available to the user might be different entities. 
5 transmission, reconciling and confirmation of payment orders) and settlement (i.e. the discharge 
of obligations as between the parties through transfer of  the amounts due) of transactions. In this 
respect, the role of network operators (e.g.  frequently, but not exclusively telecom operators) as 
carriers of financial  information, although not one of direct participation in  a payment system, 
needs to be borne in mind. 
3.  huforrmation Society and the advent of Eledronic Comme~rce 
The global  Information  revolution,  and  its  most striking examples  Internet and  the  growth  of 
electronic commerce,  is  already transforming the way.in which business and  people interact.  It 
has the potential to  become the key  stimulus for  the world's economy into the next century.  It 
appears to have become an important business tool, also affecting every day life. The Internet has 
therefore the potential of striking initial and transactional costs down to  a fraction of the  more 
traditional ways of transacting. Th.is could be particularly true of the tinancial services industry 
and, especially, of  systems and instruments for effecting payments. 
Perhaps more important in the present context is to understand if,  and when so how, crime may 
exploit information technology. The question to be answered is whether the Information Society 
and,  in  particular  E-commerce,  with  the  consequential  enhanced  use  of  information 
communication  systems  they  bring,  are  giving  rise  to  new  threats  or  barely  accelerating 
traditional pattems
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In the context of its work on the Information Society and Electronic Commerce. the Commission 
has  already  launched  a  number  of initiatives,  aiming  in  particular  at  establishing  a  clear 
framework  for  its further development, so  as  to  stimulate investments  in  electronic  commerce 
services with  ensuing benefits for  EU in  terms of growth, competitiveness and  employment. s 
Urgent progress and successful implementation of  these initiatives will no doubt contribute to the 
establishment of  an enhanced security environment, _thus ultimately also benefit payment systems 
and instruments. 
A stwdy on-computer-related criminal activities (the COMCRIME study) has been eommisstooed by DG" XIII 
and was recently finalised by Prof. Sieber, Univ. Wtlrzburg, and Prof.  Kaspersen,  Free Univ. of Amstevdam. 
http://www2. echo.lu/legal/en/comcrime/si&Jber. htm I  _ 
Th~.:sc  initiatives  include:  the  Communicati.otl  on  An  European  lniliativ&J  in  Electronitl  Commert6 
l  COM(97) 157  tina  I  or  15.04.1997};  the  proposal  for  a  Europenn  Parliarnc~lt  and  Couml'l  llire€lti;w 
IC'OM(tn)356 tina! of  09.07.1997 (97/0 I  QR (COD)l on the Legal  Protecti~m of  Sorvi{t~ based on, or cor~ing 
of, Conditional Access; the Communication from the Commission to the Europenf.l  Parliu~t. th0  Cou~id. t1w 
Economic and Social Committee· and ti'M:  CormniUce of the Regions {COM(97) 503  11nHI of I  Octo.b~o•r 1Q97 t  nm 
Ensuring  Security  and  Trust  ~n  Electronic  Cornmunication:  towards  a  European  FraR1ework  l'ot·  Dig,it-u:l 
Signatures and Encryption; the proposal for a Ewropean Parliament and Council Directive [COM{9!!)297  liua-1 
of  13.0.5.1998]  on  a  common  trame.work  tor  electronic;  the  Communication  on Ulobalisati.on  and  t~w 
Information  Society - The Neea  for  Strengthened Co-ordination"  ~COM(9-8)50 fina4J;  the  propCJsed ·Aetim 
PlaR  to promote the safe use of the Internet O.J. C 48  of 13.02.1998., whiti:l!l  f.oooses  at im:reastng oon:f:ldenee 
in the networks by a number of  action lines and is therefore part of activities to further eleatronia eomm.er.~. 
6 4.  Criminallaw 
a)  ·substantive law - types of  criminal offences 
Criminal legislation in relation to payment instruments is generally based in all Member States on 
the  concept  of "forgery"  and  "counterfeiting".  However,  these  terms  do  not  have  the  same 
meaning in all Member States' criminal law.  In general, the two elements of these behaviour are 
the act of making a false instrument or forging a genuine instrument and the fraudulent intent of 
using it.  Some legal systems include other requirements such as the existence ofa "substantial 
effect". 
All  Member States'. criminal  legislation have  criminalised the  counterfeiting of banknotes and 
coins. As regards tradition_al paper instruments (i.e. cheques), the divergence between h:gislation 
in the Member States)s more significant. In relation to payment methods such as payment cards. 
the  difference is  even more  important.  In  some countries, to  commit the offence. the· otlender 
must actually use the means of payment and sometimes even a proof of intent is  required.  The 
mere possession of a stolen or counterfeited payment card or the theft of a payment card are  not 
considered as offences in all Member State!?.  Difficulties increase when criminals make. use and 
po_ssess counterfeited payment cards rather than misuse lost or stolen cards. Most Member States 
have no laws expressly relating to payme!}t card crime and rely on existing legislation dratlcd for 
more  classical  deceptions  using  documents  which  is  not  fully  adapted  to  technological 
innovations. 
Computer and information technology abuse interacts with fraud  related to  payments. where the 
fraudsters  utilise an electronic payment system, ·or indeed whenever the  payment transaction is 
processed electronically. Criminal misuse of computers to defraud the  bencticinry of it  payment. 
the  payment card  industry,  or  the  financial  institution  is  not  always  _~:overed  by  existing 
legislation. Unauthorised access is not criminalised everywhere. Manipulation of data in l'rder to 
illicitly effect a transfer of funds is not necessarily included in the concept of swindling where 
this  requires  deceit  or  exploitation  of a  mistaken  belief,  which  could  not  easily  apply  in 
computerised communications. 
Criminal  organisations  exploit  such differences  and  opera~e from  the  least  protected ·market. 
Those  differences  in  Member  States'  legal  systems  pose  considerable  difficulties  in  the 
investigation and prosecution of  fraud across national boundaries. 
I\  first  conclusion  to  be  drawn  is  therefore  that  in  an  attempt  to  deal  with  a  Pan.:Fumpcan 
problem, ,  one  should  avoid  making  these. established  terms  the  departure  point.  and  instead 
f(.lCusing on the behaviour giving rise to the problem. 
A second conclusion is that any instrument-based or instrument dependent classification should 
be-abandoned, in favour of more durable and flexible categories. Indeed, criminal activity is not, 
a-priori and in itself, instrument-specific. Much rather, criminal offences may be : 
7 (i)  directed at the payment instrument itself,  and at the security features  that enable,  restrict 
and/or protect access to use of  the payment instrument, 
(ii)  directed  at  the  payment  transaction  itself,  including  the  system  for  ordering,  collection, 
proces·sing, clearing and settlement thereof, and/or 
(iii) related  to  the  means  for  preparing  and  carrying  on the  criminal  activity,  including  the 
(elaboration of  the) device-making equipment. 
As a consequence, it is proposed to describe the types of behaviour which should be combated, 
avoiding the use of established offences while focusing  on the target of the  offender.  This 
classification should be "intent-related" and "instrument-neutral". so as to avoid too precise a 
codification of offences, which could be subverted by technology or service innovation and 
which could lead to divergent interpretations of  the offences. 
Finally, it is useful to highlight that a behaviour-related approach has already been implemented-
and  appears  to  have  been  largely  successful  - in  the  United  States.  where  older  criminal 
legislation  for  consumer  protection  related  to  credit  cards  combined  with  newer  kgislntion 
targeting most types of manipulations with access devices,  covers all  non  paper-based payment 
methods, focusing mainly on remote access products. 
b)  procedurallaw 
In order for any court to be permitted to pass judgement over the behaviour of a person. the court  . 
must be satisfied that it has jurisdiction or right to rule over that person. 
In criminal law, the criteria fpr jurisdiction is normally that the criminal act has taken place on the 
territory of the State where the court is located, although in some Member States and for  some 
offences the nationality of the offender will  be a determining element regardless of where  the 
offence was committed. For most crimes against non-cash means of payment. and  particularly 
systems  based upon  telecommunications  infrastructures,  a transaction  may  cross one or .more 
jurisdictions on its way between the originator (the culprit) and  the tmgd (the victim). or vice 
versa.  Depending  on  how  criminal  law  is  constructed  in  the  states  involved, jurisdil-tion  can 
prevail  in  the sending as well  as in  the receivit1g slute simultaneously. The \lppositc muy  u\s,,  ~ 
true. that none of the Stal<.:s  will  have jurisdiction, uny  proposal on approximation or substantive 
criminal  law  provisions  should  therefiJrc  be  followed  by  a  discussion  on  the  question  or 
jurisdiction, and any discussion on mutual assistance must be preceded by such a discussion. 
Cooperation  between judicial  authorities  in  criminal  matters  ts  mainly  effected  by  providing 
mutual legal assistance and through extradition arrangements. 
In the former case, a Member State that wishes to prosecute for  offences but needing evidence 
from another Member State, can request and receive sm;h evidence from the state concerned. The 
8 arrangements for doing so  are mainly based upon bilateral agreements between States and the 
1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance and its protocol. Member States are at present · 
working  on  a  draft  European  Union  Convention  to  supplement  the  provisions  of the  1959 
Convention insofar as they apply to the Member States of  the European Union. 
The future Convention will seek to improve and make more efficient the applicable procedures. 
The Action Plan endorsed by the European Council in Amsterdam, in its  Recommendation  16, 
refers  to  the  importance  of this  work  for  efficient judicial  cooperation  in  the  fight  against 
organized crime  . 
. Extradition arrangements are also in place whereby a Member State can have a person charged 
with a serious offence or convicted of such an offence returned from  another Member State for 
prosecution or to serve his/her sentence in the Member State concerned. The main instrument that 
·provides arrangements for such cooperation is the 1957 European Convention on Extradition and 
its protocols. In order to  supplement and facilitate the application of this Convention. Member 
States adopted in 1995 an EU Convention on Simplified Extradition Procedures which provides 
for  a  simplified procedure for  persons who  consent to  extradition.  The  1996  EU Convention 
relating to Extradition further improves the conditions applying to  extradition between Member 
States  by  i.e.  making a  broader range of offences extraditable  by  decreasing the  threshold  of 
sentence necessary for an oilence to be extraditable. 
5  . Internationai aspects 
To ensure that approaches envisaged at the worldwide level is coherent and compatible with that 
of the EU, it is  important that all  parties (authorities,  industry and  users'  groups)  seek to  co-
ordinate  their  initiatives  in  the  relevant  international. fora  and groups,  establishing  wherewr 
possible global agreements. For instance, following the Halifax Summit, the G-8 set up a Senior 
Experts  Group  on  Transnational  Organised  Crime,  the  so  called  "Lyon  Group".  Among  its 
activities, it has discussed the launching of joint projects to  investigate and  combat particular 
forms of  organised crime. Fraud to payment cards and to other access devices received particular 
attention in this context. Currently, the Commissi.on is participating in the discussions of  all these 
for a with an objective to avoid unnecessary duplication of  efforts and facilitate coordination. 
Furthermore,  a  working  group  under  the  Council  of Europe  (the  PC-CY  or  "Cyhl·rcrimc" 
working group) is currently preparing a Dratl Convention on Computer-related crimes. in  which 
an  important  feature  is  a  fist  distinguishing  traditional  offences  that  ·canhe committed  in  a 
computer environment (e.g. "swindling"), from new offences, which are  intrinsically computer-
related (e.g. "hacking"). 
Apart  from  ongoing  information  exchange  activities  with  Countries  of Central  and  Eastern 
Europe and PHARE-financed projects, it should be noted that the Title VI  Programs GROTIUS 
and OISIN have a potential for financing individual projects directed at improving cross-border 
cooperation through enhanced knowledge, training .  and  competence of the relevant  groups of 
9 practitioners in Member States, and. that these Programs ·are ·open also to pru1icipants from the 
candidate countries.  .  :. 
Finally, .in the· context of  the pre-accession strategy and Accession Partnerships, consideration ·is 
· beil1g given to develop programs to take account-of  policy tow~ds combating organized crime  . 
.  _This could include, where appropriate; the problem offraud and counterfeitofnon-cash.payment -
systems. 
· 6.  Towards a Urmion Policy: sharing responsibilities 
In the light of  the sections above, the Commission believes that the answer to the problem lies in. 
a  common  approach,  rather  than  on  isolated,  partial  initiatives.  Moreover,  the  fundamental 
element of such an answer is that it calls for a sharing ofresponsibilities amongst all (directly or 
indirectly) interested parties, within a hierarchy of  responsibilities. 
F'irst (?lall,  instruments and the underlying systems and features allowing I'm  their usc;  must be 
technically suitable as is necessary to reduce the potential scope ft)f criminal ubusc. This is hy far . 
the "conditio sine qua non" and  the  first step for an  effective  response  to  crime.  It must  h~.:  u ' 
primary  responsibility  of the  industry 'as  a  whole  (and  participating  linanciul  institutions 
individually) to strive towards ever more secure payment applications. as it  is to clearly disclose 
to  users the actual  level  of security associated  with the different payment  products they  oiler. 
This responsibility needs to  be extended to encompass network operators. on  whom  it  rests  to 
ensure the secure exchange of  financial information. 
However, there is no doubt that technical security on its own will only help in so far as. and to the 
extent that, it succeeds in raising the protective threshold. It is not and should not  be  viewed as 
the  conclusive  solution.  All  actors  concerned  and  authorities  must  also  play  their  part  in 
promoting and implementing the appropriate framework that will lead : 
to provide incentives for early detection measures (prevention), and 
to  establish  a  safety  net  designed  at  sanctioning  offenses  where  these  have  occurred 
(sanctions). 
,\'econdly.  crime is in no way a geographically constrained phenomenon. even less so  in  ~he H~ht 
of the  present  prospective  inl(mnation revolution. To enhance the  ellcctivcness of any  action, 
there is a need wherever possible to ensure consistency of approach at international level. This is 
particularly true of organised crime. which has time and time again demonstrated the case with 
which it can conveniently migrate towards and operate from safer havens. 
10 In order to meet the challenge posed by the threats of crime in the form of fraud and counterfeit 
of non-cash means of payment, the Commission is proposing a draft Joint Action.  Its aim is  to 
ensure that fraud involving all forms of non-cash means of payment is recognised as  a criminal 
offence and  punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in all  EU  Member 
States, and that appropriate mechanisms of co-operation are put in place in order to  prosecute 
these  offences  efficiently.  This  is  without  prejudice  to  the  faculty  for  Member  States  to 
incriminate  additional  forms  of e.g.  computer crime,  like the  mere  unauthorised  access  to  an 
information technology-based payment system. 
The  Joint  Action  deliberately  avoids  the  use  of strictly  defined  qualifications  under  cxtstmg 
criminal  law  because  they  do  not  cover  the  same  elements  everywhere  ..  The  approach  taken 
instead  is  to  describe the  various  behaviour which should be  criminal .offences throughout  the 
Union in a way which does not limit the Joint Action's application to particular types of non-cash 
payment instruments. In order to do so, the list of Article _2  is drawn up on the basis of  the direct 
aim pursued by the offender. It looks at the immediate target of the fraudster:  whether the attack 
is  directed at the  payment instrument or at the making of payment instruments, or whether it  is 
directed at  one or more  payment transactions,  or at  the  system  itself for  ordering.  collecting, 
processing, clearing, and settling the payment transactions. 
Therefore, the form of a joint action was preferred:  it indicates the result to  be  achieved while 
leaving to the national authorities the choice of method. The proposed Joint Action has of course 
been  drafted  on  the  basis  of the  Maastricht  Treaty.  It will  have  to  be  adapted  to  the. new 
legislative framework  and will take the form  of a Framework Decision. when. the  Amsterdam 
Treaty comes into effect.
9 Under the existing treaty, Article 3 paras 6 and 7 and Article 6.  which 
deal  with judicial cooperation, are  not  formally  part of the  Commission's initiative.  They  are 
submitted  for consideration  by  the  Commission  in  order  to  complete  the  text.  Finally.  the 
proposal has to be seen in the context of  other instruments already adopted or still in tlu: course of 
discussion  like  the joint action criminalising the  participation in  a criminar organisation 
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-Joint Action establishing the  European Judicial Network
11  and  the draft convention on  mutual 
assistance.
12 
Additional Actions 
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This means in  particular that Art. 35 of the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union will apply. 
which provides that the Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliininary rulings on the validity and· 
interpretation of Framework Decisions, subject to declarations made by the Member States. It also provides for 
the  possibility of submission of statements of case or written observations to  the Court and gives the  Court 
jurisdiction to review the legality 9f Framework Decisions and to rule on  disputes between Member States on 
the  interpretation  of Framework  Decisions  where such  disputes  cannot  be  settled  by  the  Council  within  6 
months of having been referred to it by one of its Members.  ·  . 
Dra!l Joint Actioi1  adopted by  the  Council on  the  basis of Article KJ nf the Treaty  nn  European  llnion on 
making it a criminal offence to participate  in  a criminal organization  in  the  Member States of the Eurqpean 
Union. (not published)  · 
Proposal for a Joint Action to create a European Judicial Network (not published) 
Draft  Convention  on  Mutual  Assistance  in  Criminal  Matters between  the  Member States of the  European 
Union (not published). 
II · Furthermore~ a set .of actions aie set out in Annex 2  All interested parties are invited to consider 
these  actions~ with a view to taking the n~essary measures for their effective implementation. 
Furthermore~ in order t<l assess clearly -what additional measures, including the. l(')giSlative ones, 
.. m:ight need to ·be taken in this field, the Corrunission intends. tO stimulate a wide-ranging· debate 
with  all  interested  parties  and  encourage  them .  to  respond  to  the  issues  raised. in  this 
Communication. Comments (in  writing) to these actions are requested no later than 31  December 
1998. 
12 JOINT ACTION 
ON COMBATTING 
FRAUD AND COUNTERFEITING 
OF NON-CASH MEANS OF PAYMENT 
Annex 1 EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUIVI 
Comment'!!'J of  the articles 
Article 1 
Article 1 contains definitions of terms used in the Joint Action. These definitions are without 
prejudice to more specific definitions in the Member States. 
I.  Paragraphs  l  and 2 contain core definitions for the Joint Action.  Paragraph  I defines 
"(non-cash) payment instrument'; as described under point 1 before, i.e. including all payment 
instruments with the exception of  bank notes and coins.  · 
2.  Paragraph 2 defines "payment transaction" as any transaction tor obtaining of mt'nt!y 
or value, making or receiving of  payment in respect of  goods, services and any other thing of 
value  and/or  the  issuing  of an  order  involving  transfer  of funds  .  through  a  payment 
instrument. 
3.  The definitions include software and are linked to Article 2 (k) which lists prohibited 
activities related to device-making equipment. 
4.  The definition of "legal person" is taken from the Second Protocol to the Convention 
on the protection of  the European Communities' financial interests
1 
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5.  "money  laundering"  is  defined  as  in  the  Council  Directive  91/308/EEC  of 
1  0 June 1991  on the prevention of the use of the financial system for  the purpose of money 
laundering 
6.  The term "nationaf' is  to  be  understood  in  accordance  with  declarations  mndt:  by 
Member States to Article 6( I) (b) of  the European Convention on Extradition of 13  Pt!ccmber 
1957.  The  Extradition  Convention  will  apply  to  serious  cases under  this  Joint  Action  as 
referred to in.Article 3.3.a. 
Article 2 describes the behaviour which the joint action proposes should be incriminated in all 
Member States, if it is not yet the case2 and made subject to the provisions set out in Articles 
3,4,  5 and  6.  The  behaviour  listed  in  Art.  2  do  not  cover  mere  breaches  of contractual 
obligations. 
a)  typically corresponds to the theft of  cheques or cards; 
h)  covers, e.g.  the creation of completely false  cards, as  well  as  the  forging of existing 
ones; 
OJ No C 221, 19.7. 1997 p.  I I 
2 c)  corresponds to the selling, transmitting, etc., of payment instruments, false or falsified, 
as well as of  genuine instruments, but without authorisation of  the legitimate holder; 
d)  covers the knowing possession of  a payment instruments falling under (a) or (b) 
e)  targets the actual use of  a payment instrument falling under (a) or (b); 
f)  deals with the case where a merchant or a service provider knowingly accept a payment 
made under the circumstances described under (e); 
g)  addresses cases where for instance genuine card identification data are used without the 
authorisation of  the legitimate holder to make a payment by phone; 
h)  covers the case where completely false data are used for the same purpose; it is not to he 
understood as prohibiting pseudonyms as identification by the legitimate holder;. 
i)  concerns  the  situation  where,  for  instance,  the  information  circulated  within  the 
processing system are intentionally modified so as to direct the order to the benefit of  an 
account, other than the legitimate beneficiary of  the order; 
j)  deals with the  case where identification data are  transmitted  to  a  person who  is  not 
entitled to that information and would or could use them to obtain value or pecuniary 
advantage; 
k)  relates  to  the  means  for  preparing  or carrying  on  one  of the  criminal  behaviours 
described before; 
I) ·  covers the case for instance of possession of  specially designed holograms or papers for 
printing cheques; 
m)  extends incrimination to  anyone who would assist or instigate  any  of the  behaviours 
previously described or who knowingly benefits therefrom. 
Article 3 
1.  ·This article requires. Member .States to review their existing law and  practice with a 
view to ensuring that the measures set out in paragraphs 1 to 7 are achieved. 
2.  Paragraph I provides that the list of behaviour set out in Article 2 should be classitied 
as criminal offences. 
3.  Paragraph 2 provides that legal persons should be liable for the offences envisaged by 
paragraphs I and 5, committed for their benefit by any person, acting either individually or as 
a part of the organ of the legal person in accordance with the modalities of mi.tional  law. This 
text is modeled on Article 3 of the Second protocol to the Convention on t!1e  protection of the 
European Communities' financial interests but it has been modified so that it does not have the 
requirement  that  the  person  committing the  offence  should  have  a  leading  position in  the 
organisation and does not include liability arising out of  lack of supervision or control. 
3 4.  P<:lragt\:tj)1J  3 puts an onus on Member States to provide f{}r appropriate punishment of 
offences. lnsofur alB  m1t~ual persons are concerned, the provisions are modeled ou provisions 
contained  in  the  Co11v.cntion  ou the  protection  of the  European  Communities'  financial 
interest&, the<Protocol t0 ttmt Convention and the Convention on the fight against corruption 
involving officisls Dftht:: European Communities or officials ofL'le Member States of  the EU. 
Penalties must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 
2 
In complying with this mling , the Member States have some discretion in  determining the 
nature  and  severity of the  penalties  which  may  be  provided  for.  These  need  not  always 
necessarily  involve  deprivation  of liberty.  Fines  might  be  imposed  in  addition  or  as  an 
alternative to imprisonment. 
The  article  does,  however,.  requir~  Member  States  to  provide  for  penalties  involving 
deprivation of liberty, which can give rise to extradition, in the most serious cases  .. )t will be 
for the Member States to decide what criteria determine the seriousness of an offence in  the 
light of  their respective legal traditions. 
As far as legal persons are concerned, in some jurisdictions the concept ofcriminalliability of 
legal persons does not exist. This fact is. recognised in Article 4 of  the Second Protocol to the 
Convention  on the  protection  of the  European  Communities'  financial _interests  and  that 
Article  is the  model  used for  this  provision but  sanctions  more  appropriate  for  offences 
involving  Community  and  national  officials  have  not  been  included  in  this  text.  The 
requirement is for effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, the minimum obligation 
is to impose criminal or non-criminal fines. 
5.  As  not  all  Member  States  have  yet  ratified  the  1990  Euwpeun  Convention  on 
Laundering,  Search,  Seizure  and  Confiscation  of the  procr.!cds  fi·om  crintl\  purugruph  4 
requires  Member States to  take the  necessary  measures to  make  possible  the  seizure  and 
confiscation  or  removal  of the  instruments  and  proceeds  of the  offences  envisaged  by 
paragraph  1  and money  laundering  or property  the  value of which  corresponds  to  such 
proceeds. Instruments, proceeds or other property seized or confiscated should be dealt with in . 
accordance with national law. 
6.  The money  laundering  provisions  of the  1990  European Convention  is  applied  ·to 
predicate offences in accordance with declarations made by parties to that Convention. The 
EC Directive is limited to proceeds derived from drug trafficking offences at present although 
the Directive may in future be extended to all serious crime. Paragraph 5 establishes money 
laundering related to the proceeds of the offences envisaged by this joint action as a criminal 
offence.  Money-laundering  is  defined  in  Article  1  in  accordance  with  Council  Directive 
9 t /308/EEC of 10 June t 991. 
7.  The international nature of traud to non-cash m~ans of payhlcnt means that to !;Om hat 
it cflcctivcly rules on jurisdiction and on extradition need to be clear and to  he as progressive 
u.s  national  legal  systems will  allow to guard against persons evading prosecution.  For that 
reason the provisions in  this paragraph are modelled on provisions used  tor forms of crime 
The expression is taken over from a judgement of the Court of Justice of  the European Communities {case 
68/88, Judgement of 21.9.1989,  ECR.2965) expressed as  follows:  (the  Members States) "must ensure in 
particular  that  infringements  of Community  law  are  penalised  under  conditions,  both  procedural  and 
substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to  infringements of national  law of a similar nature 
and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive." 
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/l(o with particular international dimensions. The models used are the jurisdiction provisions of 
the  Convention  on the  protection  of the  European  Communities'  financial  interests,  the 
Protocol to  that Convention and the  Convention on the  fight  against  Corruption involving 
officials of  the Communities or officials of  Member States of  the European Union.  _, 
8.  Paragraph 6 establishes a series of criteria conferring jurisdiction to  prosecute cases 
involving  the  offences  covered  by  the  Joint  Action  on national  enforcement  and  judicial 
authorities. 
A Member State shall establish its jurisdiction in two situations: 
where the offence is committed in whole or in part in its territory, irrespectiv_e of the status 
or the nationality of  the person involved (territoriality principle) 
- where the offender is  a national  (active personality principle). The criteria of their status 
means that jurisdiction can  be  established  regardless of the  lex  locus delicti.  It  is  up  to 
Member States to  prosecute for offences committed abroad. This is  particularly important 
for Member S~ates which do not extradite their own nationals. 
However,  as  not all  Member  States'  legal  traditions  recognise  extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
Member States may, subject to the obligation under paragraph 7,  limit theirjurisdictions to 
the  first of  these two  situations.  In addition if they  do  not do so they  can still  make the 
jurisdiction rule in the second situation subject to specific situations or conditions. 
9.  Paragraph 7 takes account of the fact that·some Member States do  not extradite their 
nationals and seeks to ensure that persons alleged to have committed fraud to  non-cash means 
of payment do not evade prosecution because extradition is refused in principle on natio;lality 
grounds.  -
A Member State which does not extradite its own nationals must take the necessary measures 
to establish its jurisdiction over the offences  concerned when committed by its own nationals 
outside its territory. The offences may have been committed in another Member State or in  a  --\ 
third country. In  such circumstances the requested Member State must submit the ci1sc  to  its 
legal  authorities  for  the  purpose  of prosecution.  The  provision  is  not  intended  to  a!Tcct 
national rules regarding criminal proceedings. The requesting Member State must transmit the 
files,  information  and  exhibits  relating  to  the  offence  to  the  Member  State  which  is  to 
· prosecute the  offence.  The  requesting  Member State  shall  be  informed  of the  prosecution 
initiated and of  its outcome.  - . 
Article 4 
The purpose of Article 4 is  to  provide for co~operation between publ_ic and  private bodies ai1d  _ 
bodies  involved  in  the  control  of payment  systems  and  the  f:tUthoriti~.:s  responsible  for 
investigation and  punishment of the  offences envisaged by  the Joint Action.  Each  Member 
State must take the necessary measures, while respecting its own internal  law,  to  ensure that 
the  bodies  concerned  advise  the  relevant  authorities  where  there  is  reasonable  ground  for 
suspecting that an offence has been committed as well as providing all reasonable information 
and.  i r appropriate  take  part  as  experts  in  the  procedures.  This  article  is  modeled  on  the 
s· provisions of the Joint Action concerning action to combat trafficking in human beings and 
sexual exploitation of  children
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Article 5 
The  purpose  of this  provision  is  to  clarify  that  each  Member  State  must  ensure  that  the 
obligations as they arise from Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard 
to  the processing of personal data and on the free  movement of such data are  also  met  in 
relation to the processing of  personal data provided for in this Joint Action. The possibility of 
exchange of personal data arises in particular in Article 4.  The proposed  wording  is  made 
pending a forthcoming general discussion of  the issue of  data protection in Title VI matters. 
Article 6 
1.  The purpose of this Article is to augment instruments on international co-operation to 
which Member States are a party and which will apply to this Joint Action. 
International co-operation between judicial authorities in criminal matters is  mainly ctTccted 
by providing mutual legal assistance and through extradition arrangements. 
Mutual  Assistance  arrangements  are  contained  in  a  number  of bi-lateral  and  multilateral 
agreements  ,  notably  the  1959  European  Convention  on Mutual  Assistance  and  its  1978 
Protocol,  the  1990  Convention  on the  Schengen  Agreement  and  the  Benelux  Treaty.  EU 
Member States  are  at present working  on a draft  European Convention and  a  Protocol  to 
supplement the provisions of the  1959 European Convention on Mutual  Assistance and  its 
Protocol.  . 
Extradition arrangements are provided in the 1957 European Convention on Extradition and 
its protocols as well as in the Schengen Convention and the Benelux Treaty.  Meinbcr States 
adopted in 1995 a EU Convention on Simplified Extradition Procedures which provides for a 
simplified procedure for  persons who consent to  extradition.  A Convention signed  in  1996 
relating  to  Extrac;lition  further  improves  the  conditions  applying  to  extradition  bdwccn 
Member  States.  Both  these  instruments  will  enter into  force  following  completion  of the 
national ratification procedures. 
Other EU instruments agreed, or planned to deal with organised crime »'ill impact on the fight 
against  fraud  to  non-cash  means  of  payment.  Examples  are  the  .Joint  Action  on  the 
establishment of  a Judicial Network to facilitate judicial co-operation between Member Stutes 
and the .Joint Action making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation. 
2.  Paragraph I requires Member Stales to afford each other the widest measure of mutual 
assistance in  respect of investigation, prosecution and carrying out the  punishment imposed, 
relating to offences provided for in this Joint Action. 
3.  When a positive conflict of  jurisdiction occurs, paragraph 2 establishes that Member 
States  shall  consult  one  another  with  a  view  to  co-ordinating  their  action  to  prosecute 
effectively. 
OJ No. 63, 4.3.97, p. 2 
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(Z 4.  Paragraph 3 puts an onus on Member States to ensure that information concerning the 
offences envisaged by the Joint Action, as well as infoiTQation on persons convicted of such 
offences and information useful for investigation and prosecutions is organised in such a way· 
that it is accessible for effective use and exchange with other Member States. This provision is 
modeled on a similar provision in the Joint Action concerning action to combat trafficking in 
human beings and sexual exploitation of  children
4
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Article 7 
This  is  a  standard  article  which  refers  to  the  follow-up  and  commitment  for  the 
implementation of  this Joint Action. It establishes that the Council will assess on the basis of  a 
report made by the Commission on the fulfillment by  Member States of their obligations by 
the end of2000. 
OJ No. 63, 4.3.97, p.  2 
7  . JOINT ACTION 
adopted by the Council 
on the basis of Article K. 3 of the Treaty on European Union 
on fraud and counterfeiting of  non-cash means of payment 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article K.3 (2) (b) thereof, 
Having regard to the report of the High-Level Group on Organised Crime, approved by  the 
Amsterdam European Council on 16 and 17 June 1997, and in  p~icular Recommendation No 
18 of  the Action Plan;  · 
Considering that fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment often operate on an 
international scale; 
Considering other instruments agreed by the Council such as the Joint Action establishing the 
European Judicial Network and the Joint Action on making it a criminal offence to participate 
in a criminal organisation in the Member States of the European Union will also assist in the 
fight against fraud of non-cash means of  payment;· 
Recognising the importance ofthe work developed by various international organisations (i.e. 
the Council of  Europe, the G8, the OECD, Interpol and the UN): 
Whereas the Council considers that the seriousness and development of certain forms of fraud 
regarding  non-cash  means  of payment  require  comprehensive  solutions  including  both 
repressive measures and preventive strategies based on a sharing of responsibilities amongst 
the payment system industry, the individual users and the authorities: 
Whereas  the  Commission  submitted  a  Communication  entitled  "A framework  for  action 
combating fraud  and counterfeit of non-cash means of payment" which advocates a Union 
Policy covering both preventive and repressive aspects of  the problem; 
Whereas this Joint Action is one element of  such comprehensive approach; 
Whereas  in  order  to  achieve  approximation  of  legislation  incriminating  fraud  and 
counterfeiting ofnon-cash means of payment, a clear legal instrument is needed; 
HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION: 
8 Article 1 - Definitiollls 
For the purposes of  this Joint Action, and without prejudice to more specific definitions in the 
Member States' legislation, 
1.  "(non-cash) payment instrument" shall meari an instrument with the exception of legal 
tender  (i.e.  bank  notes  and  coins)  enabling,  alone  or  in  conjunction  with  another 
(payment) instrument, the legitimateholder/payer, to obtain money or value, to make or 
receive payments in respect of goods, services or any other thing of value, to issue an 
order or message requesting or otherwise authorising the transfer of funds (in the form of 
_ a monetary claim on a party) to the order of  a payee; 
2.  ''payment transaction" shall mean obtaining of money or value, making or receiving of 
payments in respect of goods, services or any other thing of value, and/or the issuing of 
an order or message requesting or otherwise authorising the transfer of funds (in the form 
of  a monetary claim on a party) to the order of  a payee, through a payment instrun1ent; 
3.  "device-making equipment" shall mean any equipment (including software) designed or 
adapted  for  the  acces~.  manufacture  or  alteration  of any,  or  part  of any.  payment 
instrument or payment transaction and  shall  include equipment designed  or adapll'd to 
change  or alter any  information  or data carried  on  or  in  any  payment  instrument  or 
payment transaction; 
4.  ''legal person" shall mean any entity having such status under the applicable law. except 
for  States  or  other  public  bodies  in  the  exercise  of State  authority  W1d  t()r  public 
international organisations; 
5.  "money laundering" shall mean the conduct as defined in the third indent of Article l of 
Council  Directive 91/308/EEC of  10  June  1991  on the  prevention of the  use  of the 
financial system for the purpose of  money laundering. 
6.  "national" of a  Member State shall be construed in accordance with any  declaration 
made by that State under Article 6(1) (b) of the European Convention on Extradition of 
13 December 1957. Article 2 - Description of behaviour 
In  order  to  combat  fraud  and  counterfeit of non-cash  payment  instruments  and  payment 
transactions, each Member State undertakes to review their relevant national laws concerning 
the measures set out in Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 relating to the following types of  behaviour: 
a)  misappropriation of  a payment instrument; 
b)  counterfeiting or falsification of  a payment instrument; 
c)  knowingly handling, unauthorised by the holder1 of  a payment instrument; 
d) knowingly possessing a misappropriated, counterfeited or falsified payment instrument; 
e) knowingly using a misappropriated, counterfeited or falsified payment instrument; 
f)  knowingly accepting a payment made under the  circumstances covered  by  the  previous 
indent; 
g)  knowingly unauthorised use of identification data for  initiating or processing a  payment 
transaction; 
h)  knowingly  using  fictitious  identification  data  for  initiating  or  processing  a  payment 
transaction; 
i)  manipulation of relevant data including account information, or other identification data, 
for initiating or processing a payment transaction; 
j)  unauthorised  transmission  of identificatiori data  for  initiating  or processing  a  payment 
transaction; 
k)  unauthorised  making,  handling,  possession  or  use  of device  making  equipment  l(x  the 
purpose of: 
•  manufacturing or altering any payment instrument or part thereof; 
•  initiating or processing payment transaction, or 
•  changing  or  altering  any  information  or  data  carried  on,  or  in,  .  any  payment 
instrument or transaction; 
I)  knowingly unauthorised possession of an element or part of  a payment instrument; 
m)involvement as accessory  or instigator in,  or knowingly obtaining of value or pecuniary 
advantage  derived  from  any  of the  behaviours  described  above  involving  a  criminal 
intention. 
10 Artide 3 - Meas1!1lres to be talkenn at I!D.ationnan level 
-Each Member State shall review existing law and practice with a view to providing that: 
1.  The types of behaviour set out in Article 2 ~e  classified as criminal offences. 
2.  Legal  persons can be  held  liable  for  the  offences  provided for  in  paragraphs  1 and  5 
committed for their benefit by any person, acting either individually or as part of  an organ 
of  the legal person in accordance with modalities to be defined in the national law of the 
Member State: 
3.  The penalties for these offences and for intentional participation in or attempt to commit 
them should: 
a)  insofar as  natural  persons  are  concerned,  be  effective,  proportionatc  and  dissuasive 
crimimil  sanctions  including,  at  least  in  serious  cases,  custodial  penalties  involving 
deprivation of  liberty which can give rise to extradition; 
b)  insofar  as  legal  persons  are  concerned,  be  effective,  proportionate  and  dissuasive 
sanctions which shall include criminal or non-criminal fines. 
4.  The necessary measures are taken to make possible the seizure and without prejudice to 
the rights of bona fide  third parties, the confiscation or removal of the instruments and 
proceeds of the offences provided for  in  paragraph  1 and  5,  for  property  the  value of 
which corresponds to such proceeds. Any instruments, proceeds or other property seized 
or confiscated shall be dealt with in accordance with the national law ofMemher States. 
5.  Money laundering n;Jated to  the proceeds of the offences provided  ti.1r  in  paragraph  l  1s 
established as a criminal offence. 
6.  It establishes its jurisdiction over the offences provided for in paragraphs I and 5 when::  .. 
a) the offence is committed in whole or in part within its territory; 
b) the offender is orie of  its nationals  .. 
Subject to the provisions ofparagraph 7, any Member State limy  limit the application of 
its jurisdiction to  the rules laid down in  paragraph 6.a.  A Member State which docs not 
apply such a limitation may  nevertheless apply itsjurisdiction to  the  rules laid down  in 
paragraph 6.b only in specific cases or conditions. 
7.  Where a Member State does not extradite its nationals it should establish its jurisdiction 
over  the ·offences  provided  for  in  paragraphs  1  and  5  when  committed  by  its  own  · 
nationals outside its territory. 
II Each  Member State shall,  when one  of its  nationals 'is  alleged  to  have  committed in 
another Member State an offence established in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 5 and 
it does not extradite that person to that other Member State solely on the gr:ounds of his 
nationality, submit the case to its competent  authorities for the purpose of prosecution if 
appropriate.· In  order  to  enable  prosecution  to  take  place,  the  files,  information  and 
exhibits relating to the offence shall be transmitted in accordance with the procedures laid 
down in Article 6 of the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957. The 
requesting  Member  State  shall  be  informed  of the  prosecution .initiated  and  of its 
outcome. 
Article 4-Co-operation from public and private services or bodies 
Each  Member State shall take the  necessary measures to ensure that  the  public and  private 
st:rvices and bodies involved  in  managing, monitoring and overseeing the  payment systems. 
while  respecting the  internal  law of the  Member State. \viii  Cl)-operatc  with  the  authorities 
rcsponsibk for investigation and punishment of the offenses  establish~::d by  this Joint Action. 
In particular they should: 
advise  those  authorities  on  their  own  initiative,  where  there  IS  n:asonable  ground  for 
considering that one of  these offences have been committed: 
provide those  authorities  with all  useful  information either on  request  or on their  O\Vn 
initiative; 
if appropriate, take part in the procedures as experts. 
Article 5 - Data Protection 
Concerning the processing. of personal data, this Joint Action shall be implemented so. as to 
ensure a level of protection equivalent to  the protection foreseen  in  the European Parlimnent 
and Council Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to  the processing 
of personal  data and on the  free  niovement of such data.  Daw  should  hi;.'  ust:d  only  for  lhe 
purposes for which it has been. transmitted. 
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2t, Article 6 - Co-operation between Member States 
1.  In  accordance  with  applicable  conventions,  multilateral  or  bilateral  agreements  or 
arrangements  Member  States  shall  afford  each  other  the  widest  measure  of mutual 
assistance in respect of  proceedings relating to offences provides for in this Joint Action. 
2.  Where  several Member States have jurisdiction in respect of offences envisaged  by  this 
Joint  Action,  these  States  sh~ll consult one  another with  a  view  to  co-ordinating  their 
action in order to prosecute effectively. 
3.  Each Member State shall ensure that information concerning offences envisaged by  this 
Joint Action as well as persons convicted of such offences and information which could be 
useful for investigations and prosecutions of such offences is organised in such a way that 
it  is  readily  accessible  and  can  be  effectively  used  and  exchanged  with  other  Member 
States, subject to national law governing secrecy of  proceedings. 
Article 7 - Commitment and follow-up 
1.  Each  Member  State  shall  bring  forward  appropriate  proposals  to  implement ·this Joint 
Action for consideration by the competent authorities with a view to their adoption. 
2. The Council will assess, on the basis of  a report made by the Commission, the fulfilment by 
Member States of  their obligations under this Joint Action, by the end of2000. 
3. This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal. 
4. It shall enter into force on the date ofitspublication. 
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'"2.): Annex2 
Actions to preventfra~rom  occu"ing 
a)  The payment system industry, as a. whole, including network operators, are invited to 
l)  enha:1ce the security intrinsic to the payment product on offer, the systems for the 
processing .of  transactions  originated  thereby,  including  the  carrier  network 
system, 
2)  upgrade the security of tools allowing for conditional &  discriminatory access to 
the use of  their payment products, 
3)  set up structures for exchange of information and learn  from  experience whilst 
also ensuring a high level of  confidentiality and protecting the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of  natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy. 
Furthermore, the payment system induslly is invited to 
4)  set up training programs primarily destined for timmcial institutions· own staff, as 
· \Vel!  as the development of the necessary capabilities for systematic reporting of 
criminal activities to enforcement agencies, 
5)  promote educational material directed at users of payment products (principally 
retailers and holders). 
The Commission considers that the need for an early detection of criminal  off~o:nL·cs 
should in particular be taken into account by the industry when designing the  p~1ym-:-nt 
instrument and the underlying systems (under I  and 2). mid  dedming the {potential) 
fraud to the structures designed to this purpose (under 3). 
Furthermore. to ensure a harmonious and pro-coni.petitive development of th!.!  market 
for payment services, the Commission is of the opinion that attt:>ntion  should he paid 
to ensuring that actions under I) and 2) do not lead to  an unwarranted hindrance o!' 
competition and of the development of the Information Society as a whole. notably 
through practices amounting to restrictions on access to  a  system or on  frced~)m to 
cross-border services. as well as by way of  exclusivity arrangements. 
h)  lndil'idual issuers as well as individual users (retailers and holders) me invited to 
-
pn:motc a reasonable and  fair apportionment of  responsibiliti~..:s &  liabilities between 
the  \·arious  parties  to  u  payment  system  (i.e.  between  issuer/holder;  hctwecn 
a~quin:r/retaikr). which tlwors: 
1·1 compliance with terms and conditions governing issue, use and acceptance of a 
payment instrument, 
the earliest possible notification procedure. 
The Commission thinks that as  a general policy goal,  it must be a priority to ensure 
that individual users do not suffer as a consequence of crime occurring in respect of 
the use of a payment instrument and payment systems,  unless it  can be proven that 
they have taken part in the criminal activity. Moreover, in view of the technological 
aspects  which are  under the  control  of the  participating  (financial)  institutions,  the 
burden of proof should not be put on the holder. 
Nevetiheless, users should be informed concerning the security measures they have to 
respect, .and they should assume, as citizens, a civic duty to participate actively against 
fraud,  notably  by  the  earliest  possible  notification  of the  anomalies  they  note.  in 
particular in the information they receive subsequent to a transaction. 
c)  Authorities are invited to 
coordinate information gathering and awareness raising initiatives. which may 
include industry.
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· 
assist the  industry,  individual  issuers  and  users  in  their efforts  towards  the 
achievement  of  a  security  environment.  At  EU  level  this  will  involv~.: 
promoting the establishment across the Union of a supportive r'egulatory and 
non-regulatory_ framework.  The  Commission has  already taken a  number of 
initiatives to this effect. 
At the Union level 
The  Commission stresses  that  as  the_ ex1stmg  Community  regulatory  ti·ame\\"L)rk  is 
essentially aimed at creating a Single Market within \vhich financial  services. and  m 
particular payment services, may freely circulate.  ·  -
Furthermore.  EC  legislation  in  this  field  is  mainly  de~oted  to  gtvmg  efli:cli\·~o: 
application to  the Treaty provisions. This has been achieved  by  \vay  ot' coordinating 
the  provisions  relating  to  the  taking~up  and  pltrsuit  of the- business  of  fin:1111.:ia\ 
institutions. These provisions  han~ been supported by  a number of specific pn)\  i:-;i~1ns 
harmonizing the basic rules of  prudential supervision. 
Tht.:  UK  recently  proposed  a  Joint  Action,  for  the  establishmt.:nt  of a  network  or contact  points  in  the 
Member States, to  improve exchange of information in  relation  to  credit card  fraud.  The Interpol General 
Assembly in  October 1997, adopted a proposal to  establish a  univt!~sal classific[ttion system for "bad·· l:n:dit 
cards, which  in  reality  is a clearing house function  for  the  Interpol  Secretariat to colll.!ct  information. with 
the assistance oftlw crt.:dit card industry, and  disseminate  it  through the contact lines  with  national  plllict.: 
tim:ed already existing with  lntt:rpol. Tht.:  PC-YC of the Council of Europe has  received a Belgian  t.:xrc.:n 
proposal for the establishment of contact points in  rel;ition to cyber-crimc in  gcnen11. 
1:' A nm:tJber of specific Commission .initiatives are aimed at an appropriate regulatory 
framework ~n the art!a covered by this Communication. 
[n·this context, the Commission is currently working on a draft proposal which aims to 
ensure  L~e fimmcial  integrity  of issuers  of electronic  money  and  thereby  foster 
consumers' confidence in this new means of  payment. 
Furthennore,  in  the  specific  context  of the  Information  Society  and  Electronic 
Commerce,  the  Commission  has  already  recently  adopted  a  number of measures 
including the proposal for a directive on the legal protection of  s~rvices based on, or 
consisting  of,  conditional  access  and  the  proposal  for  a  directive  on  electronic 
signatures.  In  addition,  in  the  field  of secure  payment  systems  for  electronic 
wmmerce,  the  Commission  has  co-funded  several  industry-wide  R&D  initiatives 
under various information and telecommunications technology programs
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• 
The  Commission  has  already  recently  issued  a  Recommendation
7  concermng 
transactions  by  electronic  payment  instruments  and  in  particubr  the  reiationship 
between  issuer  and  holder,  thereby  setting  out  the  minimum  transpan!ncy, 
responsibility, liability, and redress requirements. The Commission has undertakt:n to 
monitor its implementation until the end of 1998. If  impl~mt!ntation is not  fixmd ll"'  h!.? 
satisfactory, the Commission will propose a Directivt! in this dl)main. 
Furthermore, the Commission has announced that it also intends to modernise und up-
date an earlier 1987 RecommendationK with a view to establishing a dear franll.'\\\Wk 
tor the relationship between acquirers and acceptors in  respect of ekdronic paym..:nt 
instruments.  In  this  context,  the  Commission  may  take  into  consideration  the 
possibility of  applying particular conditions to  the collection of  payment cards St.' as h1 
take into account the absence or-repetition of fraud. This would contribule h) redul·in!! 
the risk factor of  the payment instrument and the underlying system. 
E.~. prnj..:ct J\C026 Sl.:fv1PER- S..:cun: Eli.:ctronic Marketplace for  Europ..:. 
Communication  from  the  Commission to the  European  Parliament, the Council, the  European  Monetary 
lJhtitutes and the Economic and Social Committee: "Boosting customers' confidence in  electronic means of 
payment in  the Single Market"; COM(97) 353 final of09.07.1997: O.J. L 208 of02.08.1997, p.  52. 
Cl'tnmission Recommendation 87/598/EEC of 8 December 1987 on a European Code of Conduct relating 
to  dectmnic  payment  (relations  between  financial  institutions.  traders  and  service  establishments.  and 
CllllSlii11CfS). O.J. N' L 365 of24 Dt:ccmber 1987. rage 72. Annex3 
The corresponding Community regulatory framework 
The present annex briefly summarizes the key elements of Community law making up  the 
regulatory framework within which financial, and in particular payment services, are offered, 
mediated and used. 
The primary source of law is the EC Treaty. Firstly, as an indispensable precondition for the 
integration of domestic financial markets and, thereby, a Single Market for  linancial services, 
articles 73b to  73g of the EC  Treaty introduce the regime of free  movement of capital  and 
payments  within  the  Community  and  in  respect  of third  countries.  Secondly,  articles  52 
(freedom  of  establishment)  and  59  (freedom  to  provide_  services)  of  the  Treaty  arc 
cornerstones of  the  Single Market  edifice  for  financial  services  in  that  they  enable  firms 
respectively to set up (and be authorized) in m1e  Member State. ui1der the supervision of that 
Member State's authorities, as well as to freely  provide services throughout the Community 
under the single authorization of  the Member State of  establishment. 
The secondary source or law  in  the  field  l)f financial  services  is  embodied  in  the  layer or 
Community  legislation  devoted  to  giving  effective  application  to  the  Treaty  provisions 
recalled. 
This has first and foremost been achieved by  way of coordinating the provisions relating to 
the  taking-up and pursuit of the  business of financial  institutions,  notably  those or credit 
institutions,  investment  firms  and  insurance  undertakings.  These  provisions  have  been 
accompanied and supported by a number of  specific provisions harmonizing the basic rules o!' 
prudential supervision. 
Amongst  the  directives  in  the  field  of financial  services  is  a  Council  Directive  on  the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpos·e ofinoney la~mdering  q.  Based on 
the recognition that money laundering is often carried out in an internatil)nal Clmtext so that 
the criminal origin ofthe funds and its proceeds may be better disguised. the directive sets the 
basis for international co-ordination of a non-penal nature, placing  ~1  number M requit\:mcnts 
on  Member States:  notably,  a  requirement to  prohibit money  laundering.  rcquirenH:nts  on 
credit  and.  financial  institutions  to  identify  their  customers and  to  record  transactions 
exceeding  certain  amounts,  requirements  on  institutions  to  examine  and  report  any 
transactions which they regard as likely to be related to money laundering, and a requirement 
that  authorities  responsible  for  combating  this  phenomenon  co-opcrall'  with  l'l'l'dit  and 
.linancial institutions and their supervisory authorities. 
Council Directive of' 10 June  1991; OJ  L 166177  of28~6.91. 
17 Although the financial services directives are targeted primarily at the financial service sector, 
they  are  also  concerned  with the  rights  and  interests  of consumers.  They  contain  certain 
provisions that safeguard consumers' rights to correct and complete information, protect their 
legal interest and provide access to means of  redress. 
Recently, pressure has been building up to  reinforce the concept that the single market for 
financial services is  not just for business. In May  1996 the Commission decided to  issue a 
Green  Paper  on  Financial  services:  meeting  consumers'  expectations  to  have  a 
comprehensive  debate  on  consumer  policy  in  financial  services.  On  26  June  1997,  the 
Commission  adopted  a  follow-up  Communication · on  Financial  services:  enhancinj{ 
consumer con:fidence/0.  The Communication announces a series of forthcoming  initiatives, 
some of which have already been launched (e.g. an extension of the recommendation on  new 
means of payment) or arc  in  the  process of being launched,  including a future  proposal on 
distance contracts for financial services. 
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